Zimbabwe: Home of the brave and land of the free

Robert Mugabe’s appearance at the World Food Summit in Rome has been described as “obscene” by observers mindful of the human rights disaster that is Zimbabwe, and the atrocities being carried on prior to the run-off presidential election — more so now that opposition MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai was detained and then released from a police station north of Bulawayo.

While I have little or no sympathy for the man who refuses to relinquish power, the manner in which land redistribution failed in Zimbabwe now requires South Africa’s careful attention. In light of events at Polokwane and the expectations flowing therefrom, this issue is going to become critical sooner rather than later.

In this discussion I will try to highlight the history of this process in Zimbabwe and leave the suggestions of how it can best be tackled in South Africa to you. Where we must not falter is in expecting the status quo to remain until something drastic happens, for therein lies the tragedy that is Zimbabwe.

White farmers first settled in Southern Rhodesia late in the 19th century. British persistence that this land formed part of the property of the Crown gave rise to pressure for self-government. In 1923 this was achieved and gave rise to the segregationist Land Apportionment Act of 1930.

In terms of this Act, which remained as the guiding light on land until independence, land was divided into three different sections. Land owned by whites, land held in trust for indigenous tribes and land for blacks.

This gave rise to a number of grievances among the black farmers including but not limited to the following: lack of access to funding to develop substantial farms in the black section; blacks being evicted from land in the white sections; and inability to plan or develop farms that were held in trust in respect of the tribal section.

Much as people like to waive this away as early history, it gave rise to resentment which was felt post-independence. While whites are undoubtedly being victimised by Mugabe, a sense of balance has to be achieved by pointing out where much of this anger started.

In November 1965, Rhodesia became a sovereign state in terms of a unilateral declaration of independence from Great Britain. What was once a self-governing colony became a white minority ruled state under the leadership of its first prime minister, Ian Smith.

At that time more than 70% of the arable land was in the hands of the white minority, who made up less than 2% of the population. This further infuriated the majority of the population and featured among the underlying causes giving rise to the Bush War between the white minority government and black nationalists from 1971 to 1979.

In 1980, following the Lancaster House Agreement, the state of Zimbabwe came into being. One of the major stumbling blocks to reaching agreement had been the question of land and how to redistribute it. The dispute was brokered by the British government agreeing to fund the buying out of those farmers who wanted to leave the country — the so-called willing buyer, willing seller option. The money was given to the Zimbabwean government who would buy out the farmers concerned.

During the 1980s, a series of land Acts were passed, but without sufficient funds at the disposal of the Zimbabwean government, less than half of the families targeted were resettled. In light of the willing buyer, willing seller agreement, the government was also picking up a lot of resistance from the white farmers.

In 1992, the Land Acquisition Act was brought in to allow for the compulsory acquisition of land by the government, albeit at a fair price. Owners could and did use the courts to deal with prices that they believed were unfair.

Over the next five or six years some land was acquired but the British and American aid being used to fund much of these acquisitions was to come to a halt due to allegations of cronyism against Mugabe. The donors were of the view that instead of benefiting the black farmers, the president was giving land to all his mates.

This would signal a rise in tension between Mugabe and his former partners in aid, namely the United States and Britain.

In 1998 a land reform Act and resettlement programme aimed at acquiring 50 000 square kilometres over five years was introduced. It was to be in the form of 10 000 square kilometres per year with 48 countries willing to assist in the form of donations or advice.

Once again the plan hit a brick wall with the government being unable to get land owners fully behind the programme — which brings us to the next significant milestone, the drafting of a new Constitution for Zimbabwe in 1999. The parties who drafted the document placed restrictions on the presidency, including an age limit of 70. These were unacceptable to Zanu-PF, which not only removed those clauses but inserted in their stead the infamous land redistribution without compensation.

The MDC was vehemently against the new Constitution, which they believed entrenched Mugabe. Then, extraordinarily, knowing he had enough seats in Parliament to pass it through, Mugabe called for a referendum in 2000. This was extremely fair in the circumstances. But despite best efforts and in a fair vote, the Constitution was rejected by a clear majority.

Had Mugabe gone along with the wishes of his people at this point in time, despite some of the atrocities he had already committed, he would probably still have gone down in history as one of Africa’s greatest liberators. Yet instead of graciously accepting the loss and adjusting his direction accordingly, he went tilt.

With the MDC jubilant and pointing to the result as a clear signal of the end of Mugabe and Zanu-PF, all hell broke loose. He unleashed the “war veterans” and began his campaign of land seizures, which claimed more than 100 000 square kilometres of farmland without compensation. In tandem he postponed elections on the pretext of voter registrations for 2002.

The election in 2002 found Mugabe basing his campaign upon “land reform” and subjecting his countrymen to intensive intimidation. Although it was “a victory” for Zanu-PF, two South African judges, Khampepe and Moseneke, clearly believed that the conducting of it left much to be desired. In addition there are many who believe that Zanu-PF and Mugabe lost outright but jimmied the results.

In 2005, all farmland was nationalised with owners only entitled to acquire leases and no challenges permitted to the courts.

The number of white farmers had fallen from several thousand in 2000 to between 55 and 60 in 2008. This, as we know, has not stopped Zanu-PF from terrorising even this handful as part of the “land-reform programme” for the 2008 election, which Zanu-PF subsequently lost.

The enormous loss of productivity experienced in the Zimbabwean agricultural sector from 2000 onwards is down to a number of factors. These include but are not limited to the following: giving farms to cronies instead of black farmers; failing to provide the necessary training or experience to these farmers; lack of funding being made available to these new farmers; and failing to provide proper mechanisms to ensure a smooth transition from white farmers to black farmers.

Today Zimbabwe, formerly the bread basket of Africa, even with favourable weather, can’t begin to feed itself.

We know that from the referendum in 2000 onwards Mugabe and Zanu-PF had lost their majority. In desperation to cling to power, they started handing out gifts of land to bribe the people and thereby destroyed the agricultural sector because no proper mechanisms were put in place to do this.

The more they handed out, the more the situation deteriorated, which meant an ever-tightening grip on the population and the opposition was required. This was achieved through the police and the army allied to a media clampdown in order to avoid rebellion while keeping the people in the dark.

Which finally arrived at this humanitarian disaster with its daily reports of beatings, murder and intimidation of the population, amid the countdown to the presidential run-off, that we know today.

No question that Mugabe completely lost the plot in 2000. Had he adjusted his bearing and tried to bring in policies to uplift his people and steady the ship he may well have won the 2002 election legitimately and gone on from there.

What we as South Africans must not lose sight of is the fact that there is a lot of expectation among our poorer communities. Already we have seen our Landbank hit the wall for reasons we are still waiting to hear. The ANC is facing claims of non-delivery while white farmers are being killed and coming under attack.

The recipe, if you track back to what occurred in Zimbabwe, for the same disaster is there.

The ANC has no choice but to start fulfilling its promises made to the electorate. The FF+, I would imagine, has many members who are steeped (for want of a better word) in farming. AfriForum and the black trade unions have the ear of their workers.

Tony Leon spoke of using all people of best competence in the interest of South Africa. Instead of the ANC having to justify non-delivery or the FF+ having to scream about lack of police action for white farmers being killed, the time has come to call in the best brains in the fields required to put together a plan of action that marries expectation to compensation while ensuring transition to competent farmers.

Why should our farmers be made to feel unworthy and take their considerable talent and experience elsewhere? Why are they training black farmers in other African countries while there is so much potential and need here?

If a feasible plan of action is put into place by the agricultural sector and then taken to the World Bank, as a way of avoiding becoming a Zimbabwe, then the 48 countries who were prepared to help Zimbabwe way back when plus plenty more, having seen what happened there with its cost to the region, would surely lend an ear.

Oh, as always, don’t forget to tell the people what you’re doing while you’re doing it.