'Issues that arouse' - Thought Leader

“The issues that arouse at the Special Conference of the South African Communist Party last year, in relation to the ANC delegation to the conference, will be finalised at a bilateral … ” So reads the last paragraph of the section dealing with the alliance in the ANC’s post-Lekgotla statement released today. Clearly this is a spell-check error, either in the original statement or its capturing by the media. The intention was to say, the issues that “arose”. But when it comes to matters of relations between the alliance partners’ issues that arose, they are not mutually exclusive of the issues that arouse. This is especially true with reference to the events of that took place at the special conference in question. From the weekend media reports it seems that issues that “arouse” continued at this weekend’s Lekgotla.

The ANC NEC’s Lekgotla statement is characteristically measured, economic and diplomatic. But it does not manage to hide all the matters that “arouse”. The longest section of the statement has to do with “organisational building”, “the envisaged community” and “branch-building campaigns”. Clearly, the strategy is to douse and regulate the fires that manufacture the issues that “arouse” by building a stronger party. ANC branch members will be occupied with such “revolutionary activities” as doing “community profiles”, community development projects, special project campaigns, cadre development projects and the million-member recruitment drive, all culminating in the grand 2010 centenary celebrations. Will these be enough to keep the leadership away from succession posturing? The thinking is probably that if all branch members do these things there will not be enough time left for mischief and in that way matters that arouse within the movement and between the movement and its partners will be greatly diminished. Add to this the soon-to-be-revealed and much-awaited local government turn-around strategy which will, among other things, rid us of schizophrenic local government officials who confuse their party roles with their administrative roles.

It is clear, however, that the ruling party has to deal with issues that “arouse” within itself, between the ruling party and government, between the ruling party and its alliance partners, between the ruling party and opposition parties and between government and the people of South Africa. The problem of schizophrenia may not be limited to local, municipal government officials and party leaders. It is a problem that runs deeper and wider — even up to the highest levels. It is not merely a problem with officials — individuals and groups — it is also a structure and process problem.

The January 8 2010 statement itself manifests the problem of conflating the party with the government and vice-versa. From this, many matters arise and they arouse. There are problems of the “management of contradictions” (the statement’s own phraseology). The ANC is by nature a movement riddled by and built on contradictions. For the contradictions to be managed well it is important that there is a common script across the board even if different actors will act out their part in accordance with their talents and emphases. Matters that arouse, arise also in relation to the management of relations between the alliance partners. It is clear that there has been (and might still be) a serious bid to revise the position of the ANC within the alliance. At no time has the much-repeated statement that says “the ANC is the leader of the alliance” rung as hollow and sound as forced as it has when uttered by alliance leaders since Polokwane. No wonder then that no sooner is this statement issued, it is qualified in all sorts of ways.

It now seems that the (media) hype around the need for “defiant” Malema to be disciplined was just that, hype. The statement does not even contain a hint at censure for Malema. In any case the attempt to simplify the alliance matters that arouse by reducing them all to one actor, in the name of Julius Malema was always too simplistic.

In the final analysis, it does seem that the Zuma presidency is dogged by the same matters that aroused passions during the Mbeki presidency. In fact the January 8 statement reminded me so much of Mbeki that I wondered whether the former president’s speech writers had not secretly penned the statement. It is a statement that is more about the government than it is about the party — that is rather Mbeki-esque.

But other worrying similarities are emerging. The fundamental macro economic policy — market driven neo-liberal trajectory — remains firmly that, whose foundations were laid by Mbeki. For all the much broadcast so-called unprecedented growth we are supposed to have enjoyed, jobs were not forthcoming (the recession has wiped away the little that was there) and the gap between rich and poor has widened. Mbeki’s economic policies failed dismally to fundamentally transform the economic face of this country. Why does the current regime seem to think it can succeed by simply giving us more of the same?

Admittedly, we must await the full impact of the planning and monitoring divisions in the presidency, but eight months later we have reason to begin feeling restless, don’t we? Without implying that the government had no problems (huge problems with implementation!) it must be remembered that Mbeki did not fail to manage government, he failed to manage the party, its alliance partners and he failed to handle the succession challenge (hence his attempt to get a third term). I am afraid that the same issues of how to manage the party, how to manage the tensions and contradictions between members of the alliance as well as how to manage the question of succession have begun to trouble President Zuma. The jury is still out as to whether he will do better than his predecessor in managing the issues that arouse.