Would Zuma and Mbeki factions entertain a compromise candidate?

When the ANC held its 52nd national conference at Polokwane, concerns were expressed that should Jacob Zuma be elected as party president, it might well leave national President Thabo Mbeki as a lame duck for the balance of his term. As it turned out, the ANC became divided into two centres of power — the government, led by the Mbeki faction, and the party, led by the Zuma faction.

Into that mix we also had to factor the corruption charges against Zuma, claims by his supporters that the Mbeki faction had engineered his prosecution, the vested interest of Cosatu, the SACP and the ANCYL in seeing Zuma elected as the country’s president, and lately others who are staking their own claims to profit from a Zuma presidency by pressurising the judiciary, criminal justice system and even the media.

Going into Polokwane I confirmed my support for Mbeki as I believed that despite glaring errors, he was doing a decent job overall. Post-Polokwane I have taken the view that the delegates made their decision, which must be respected. The party faithful must unite behind Zuma as the ANC president, which, in the ordinary course, should lead to the national presidency at the next election.

As it transpired, the two centres of power manifested itself in the form of an ugly running battle that has materially weakened the party’s ability to restore discipline within its own ranks and sanction those who allegedly support it but are using this division to feather their own nests. Moreover, any suggestion that the split should correct itself after the elections does not take into account the ongoing faction fights that occur every time even the smallest post is up for grabs.

The JZ corruption trial and the effect it is having on the ongoing factionalism within the party and on the country itself requires all South Africans to keep applying their minds in an effort to resolve this issue sooner rather than later. Poverty, crime and a global economic crisis require a government that is focused on the front line rather than concerning itself with what is happening back at party headquarters.

We have already looked at the possibility of the party bridging that gap through the granting of an amnesty or finding a political solution that is acceptable to both factions, while bringing in opposition parties to negotiate the deal in order to strengthen our constitutional democracy. This, unfortunately, in my opinion, will still leave the factions very much in place and the ANC leadership indebted to those who have assisted them in achieving that result, should this prove to be the case.

In light of the above and the ongoing unrest that the Zuma trial and the factionalism is occasioning, I believe that the next item on the list for consideration should be the question of a compromise candidate for the presidency of South Africa. This would be a candidate that both the Mbeki and Zuma factions consider acceptable and who would unite the party under one banner once again.

While we should never underestimate the anger that this will occasion among those who have supported Zuma throughout, there are greater concerns that need to be addressed — issues relating to the party’s inability to defend itself from attacks from within and from outside, and none of which relates to the opposition parties. The total disregard for the party and the conflicting instructions coming from the top have exposed a very vulnerable underbelly that can be exploited by opportunists whose only concern is positioning themselves at any cost to party or country.

This will not result in a healthy shift in the vote to the opposition parties as you would find in a more established democracy but rather a government paralysed by internal strife with those opportunists, on an ongoing basis, taking advantage of both factions to expand their authority. This is to no one’s advantage save the spoilers themselves.

The obstacles to a compromise candidate are not, in my humble opinion, insurmountable. If both factions were to endorse the compromise candidate unconditionally, the masses would be aggrieved at first but then accept their decision. The benefits are obvious as the ANC would then act as a unit and concentrate on preparing for the election while focusing on government priorities and instilling discipline across the board. Vitally for the country, there would be no danger of the factionalism continuing after the election; most important of all for the party, the leadership would no longer be at the mercy of those seeking favours in return for assisting a faction.

Let’s look at a possible scenario.

The two camps would agree on the compromise candidate. In this regard I am not going to suggest anyone because that would taint the person concerned. It must be a party decision.

Simultaneously the legal representatives of JZ would enter into a plea bargain (section 105A of the Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 as amended) for the ANC president. If we could allow Mark Thatcher this opportunity, we can certainly do the same for JZ. In addition a substantial package of benefits would be given by the party, not the country, to compensate JZ for standing down on the biggest job in South Africa. Whether it would allow him to continue as ANC president would be up to the party, but in order to restore unity this must be given careful consideration.

In terms of the Zuma faction, the NEC is already in place and while JZ won’t be the one handing out Cabinet posts, there would be sufficient representation at the top to ensure that most of those promised their day in the sun would still achieve that. However, anyone who made a mockery of the party by militancy, threatening the government or the country, showing their backside or any other conduct not worthy of the ANC, regardless of whom they are prepared to die for, must then be thrown out of the party permanently.

An immediate instruction would be needed from the top that any form of factionalism would henceforth result in anyone starting or belonging to a faction being permanently thrown out of the party. Any disrespect shown to the party or leadership would bring immediate sanctions against those individuals involved.

Any threats from other bodies purportedly allied to the party would be considered in the most serious light.

Obviously there would be a whole host of other considerations that would need to be addressed prior to implementation, but this is another way in which this issue can be resolved.

Over to you.