Zille: Donatella Quixote

By making a decision to introduce legislation, which will ban officials from doing business with the state, the DA proves that collectively they have no clue about eradicating corruption.

Indeed, while yes, there are loopholes which allow for the state to be pillaged by people who have been entrusted with running the state, and yes, material interests probably need to be fully declared; the DA’s approach fails to address the real problem, and that is that it is not illegal for a political party or a political organisation to receive the proceeds of public expenditure, whether during or after the transaction, nor is it illegal for a political party or a political organisation to benefit from the proceeds of public licencing and concessions.

This was proved by the Chancellor House incident, where Eskom and the ANC were found to be doing business with each other. To date, neither the ANC nor any of its cadres who were involved in that episode have been charged with corruption-related crimes.

So even though the honourable Western Cape Premier means well when she says we must stop councillors, MPL’s, MP’s, DG’s and other civil servants from awarding state contracts to their wives, relatives, friends and associates; she fails to address the fact that anyone can buy equity in a public company, like a listed construction company, and because one would have to be “significant shareholder” to be mentioned or acknowledged in any way, that it is perfectly possible for a politician to benefit without anyone knowing it from the contracts over major infrastructure projects.

The fact is that clamping down on the tender racket is an important step and we need to take this step, because the Zanu-PF model of circular reticulation is just around the corner, as proved by the very existence of Chancellor House. However, to start with we must outlaw the payment of the proceeds of taxpayer’s money to political parties and political organisations.

This is because in every one of these rackets there is someone who is politically senior to the figures involved in the corruption, who has acquiesced to the racket in the first instance. This protection from “up on high” may just be one notch above, it may be on the tender board itself, or it may be among those who decide to authorise the procurement in the first place. And that hierarchy is political in nature and it serves a political purpose.

But most of all loyal cadres who bring in funding to the party, via branches, zones and constituency offices, or to regional, provincial or national offices; generally don’t get fired and always get promoted within reason. So while the party may know nothing about the corruption, the fact is that the proceeds of the corruption are used to ensure the position of the individuals who committed the crimes, through the patronage of the party.

This patronage may just take the form of political activities which don’t cost the party anything, or it may take the form of donations to the party or to specific decision makers within the party — but in all of these cases the party benefits from the proceeds of public expenditure.

While it is necessary to prevent public servants from “doing business” with the state in any form, but it is also important to prevent political parties from benefiting in any way from the proceeds of the state’s financial power. There is, after all, assuredly no difference between a DA voter who does business with the Western Cape or Cape Town governments and who contributes to change by making donations to the DA; and an ANC voter who does business with any other instance of South African government and who contributes to the national democratic revolution by making donations to the ANC.

Factually, someone has to rig the tenders and the licence allocations, and since these are competitive processes, someone else has to know about why this particular company won the bid. And in this scenario, all of the people who “know why” a particular company won the bid, need to be paid or placated in some way. This is clearly the same operational environment as the Mafia and organised crime and should be treated as such.

We have the capacity to intercept, monitor and record all electronic communication, through Comsec, and we should use that capacity to know everything about our public servants. Clearly, they have to meet and discuss these activities, and even if you’re just tracking the people with whom they communicate, and then the people with whom those people communicate, and then correlating this list of people to the beneficiaries of public procurement, you will be able to see the networks of corruption which prevail; because there is no such thing as honour among thieves and because in the world of tender-rigging, one must be sure that your slice comes off the top and that your slice doesn’t get consumed in the operating costs of the business.

However these efforts do nothing to address the reality of another form of corruption, that of buying influence. One wonders why its not OK for ANC people to launder the proceeds of public expenditure in support of ANC policy; but it is OK for mining companies to donate to both the ANC and the DA to ensure that the mines are never nationalised?

Perhaps the real debate needs to be had on the funding of political parties, and why political parties and politicians are all without exception, politically insolvent and bereft of political autonomy. But then again, given that the DA and Cope seem to be readying themselves, jointly, to speak Cosatu’s language, one wonders what sort of legitimacy the DA has in tackling this matter of corruption, when it is ostensibly in league with Cope.

And let’s be very honest about from whence Cope’s funding has come, shall we? No, is that too much of a reality check for Donatella Quixote?