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Richard Calland and the Maimane moment

Richard Calland’s latest article (“Maimane may engineer Zuma’s exit”) is a master class in fanciful political analysis. Even if published in the opinion section of the Mail & Guardian, its grasp on reality makes it more suited to fiction than a newspaper. His belief that the next leader of the DA would be able, or want, to pave Zuma’s exit from office is gravely mistaken.

In Calland’s world, the pressure on Jacob Zuma has reached its zenith. He argues that were Mmusi Maimane elected DA leader, he would have the opportunity to work with ‘‘the critical mass of people on both the left and the right of the ANC who … now … acknowledge that any use that Zuma had to them, their party and the country is outweighed by the damage he has done’’.

Calland argues this ‘‘critical mass’’ would be willing to see Zuma go because of the DA’s pending spy tapes case, that Calland believes will be successful. Many in the ANC ‘‘who wish to reach ‘a political solution’ … would regard (Zuma’s departure) as a small price to pay’’.

‘‘Maimane would offer to withdraw the … case in the public interest, in return for a cast-iron promise that Zuma would go.’’ Calland says that ‘‘a person or party other than the DA could relaunch the review proceedings but … South Africa tends to move on quickly. Zuma would be rapidly forgotten”.

Gallo
Gallo

Calland concludes by saying that ‘‘many would thank Maimane if he took this approach. It might just be a stroke of brilliant political genius. Certainly, the mood in the investment world and in the C-suites of corporate South Africa would lift, just as progressively minded democrats would celebrate the end of the toxic Zuma years’’.

There are three problems with this analysis:

Firstly, he does little to identify who this critical mass is and explain what power they have. By ignoring the consequences of South Africa’s single-dominant party system, he suggests that power or opinion outside the ANC counts. Largely, it does not. Had it mattered, the ANC would have lost power a long time ago. Moreover, he misses Zuma’s biggest strength: the centralisation of power within himself and his allies; the subordination of sites of opposition within the party — now occupied by those dependent on his patronage; and, his co-option of potential rivals into his fate by making them complicit in his continued freedom. Yes, Zuma has betrayed many people. And yes, they speak about change. What Calland misses, though, is their anger stems from an inability to no longer change Zuma — not what he does.

Secondly, the ANC has no incentive to deal. After spending as much political capital as they have on defending Zuma, any reneging would be an admission of failure. It is almost as violently allergic to that as it is losing power. Ironically, the DA has no incentive to deal either. Its last-minute surge in 2009 is attributable to its aggressive “Stop Zuma” campaign. Maimane, too, has made a meal of his highly personalised critique of the president. The real ‘‘political genius’’ would be to not abandon a vote-winning formula. Why should they assist the ANC out of a tight corner, as it will be in when it faces up to Zuma’s legacy, rather than inflict maximum damage? With the Economic Freedom Fighters waiting in the wings to capitalise on any ‘‘establishmentarian set-ups’’, there is even less reason.

Thirdly, Calland attempts to have it both ways on the question of law. It cannot be that the case is so strong that Zuma is likely to lose — creating the political incentive to deal — but the solution be that Zuma should actually win. Calland must decide whether the national interest is for this case to go to trial and have Zuma held accountable, or, in this instance, when it suits him, for the rule of law to be subverted. He cannot have it both ways. And if he chooses the latter, he, and all the other members of the chattering classes who agree with him, must hold their collective tongue when equality before the law is disregarded in future.

Calland’s eagerness to believe in Maimane’s prowess is no doubt shared by many. If Maimane defeats his only rival, Wilmot James, then he can try meet those expectations. But, to expect him to do so in a way puts political pragmatism above the rule of law, a betrayal — not only to the DA’s liberal heritage but South Africa’s Constitution too.

Author

  • Kameel Premhid is a hack. He has opinions and writes about them. He dabbles in everything, which he shamelessly self-promotes, in an attempt to anger as many people as possible. He holds a BA and LLB from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and is reading for a degree at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, as a Rhodes Scholar. Follow him on Twitter: @kameelpremhid

2 Comments

  1. v_3 v_3 2 May 2015

    While Premhid touches on the reaction in the ZANC, neither he nor Calland consider the reaction withing the DA.

    Were the new DA leader (lets call him “Wilmot of Mmusi”) to begin his term of office with a shady deal, what would it do to his position. I doubt even Zille could have pulled it off without a revolt from the DA MPs and members.. A new leader, trying to unite a party, certainly could not and should not.

    Calland’s article merely shows how out-of-touch the commentariate can be.

    I also fail to see how such a breakdown in the Rule of Law could possibly be in the public interest or benefit South Africa.

  2. PeterJohn Saunders PeterJohn Saunders 4 May 2015

    Who may or may not be a true revolutionary is entirely besides the point in a review of a book, this book specifically. This is a superficial response to one of SA’s most insightful political analysts. This says more about your own insecurities and a fear that Calland might just be correct.

    It may well be that you have studied Calland’s many published works in journals and books that make up his long and extensive experience in this field, but there is no evidence of that in this post.

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