Lacan's theory of discourse

A commentator on one of my recent posts on discourse asked a question about the discourse analysis of capitalism. Lacan had something interesting to say about that — he remarked that the discourse of the capitalist is the “cleverest discourse” ever devised by humans. One may wonder why, but it is only when one has a reasonable grasp on his very sophisticated theory of discourse that this remark about capitalism starts making sense.

Although I have had a number of papers on Lacan published, I do not profess to be an authority on his (very difficult) work — for that, one has to turn to the work of Slavoj Zizek, Joan Copjec, Kaja Silverman, Bruce Fink, Jacques-Alain Miller, Jonathan Lee, and, in South Africa, Andrea Hurst. As Derrida once remarked about the ancient philosophers, I can honestly say that, with Lacan (and with Derrida, for that matter), I am always a beginner. But that does not mean that one should not grapple with him/them — on the contrary, all worthwhile philosophy entails a certain difficulty in thinking.

Unlike Foucault, whose theory of discourse is pluralistic (like Wittgenstein’s, although he calls discourses “language games”) in the sense that there are as many discourses as one can distinguish rules governing meaning, interests, or points of cratological (power-related) gravity, in anyone’s use of language. Lacan gives us a typology of discourse. In other words, while, for Foucault, there is a discourse of fascism, of democracy, of patriarchy, of feminism, of socialism, of ludic (play-) involvement, of bureaucracy, of revolution, and so on, Lacan groups all the many discourses that we encounter under four headings, namely that of “the master”, of “the university” (or “of knowledge”), of “the hysteric” and of “the analyst”. Later he adds another, that of “the capitalist”, but this is a pseudo-discourse, insofar as it pretends to be what it is not, as I shall try to explain.

This can get quite “technical”, so let me give the “straightforward” explanation first. The “master’s discourse” is a name given to any use of language in which some people are constituted in the position of power, and others in the position of servants (those who serve the ones in power) or “slaves”, metaphorically speaking.

The discourses that initially shape our subjectivity as children, are usually master’s discourses of some kind, such as that of the church (which is also an example of a patriarchal discourse), of patriarchy (“listen to me because I am your father!”), of nationalism, of socialism, and so on. Even the discourse of democracy is a master’s discourse in practice, albeit a paradoxical one, insofar as it elevates “the people” to the position of master, but those individuals who accede to positions of power in political parties or governments usually act as agents of the party’s or government’s master’s discourse, in this way perverting the supposed “power of the people”.

By contrast, the “discourse of the university” (or of knowledge) is a use of language that gives the subject who utters it a position of power through structuring life, or social relations, in terms of knowledge, in the process making one aware of one’s lack of knowledge or finitude. Or so it seems. In truth, however, as Lacan points out, the university discourse is that of a slave to the master, insofar as the university (and the sciences represented there) more often than not serve the master’s discourse of the day. In the middle ages it was the master’s discourse of the church in Europe, in the 19th century it was the political discourse of nationalism, and today it is the master’s discourse of neoliberal capitalism (with a twist to this tale, as I shall show later) which is served by the university discourse as its slave. (Ask yourself which disciplines are prioritised at university.)

Although Lacan initially seemed to associate the discourse of the university with that of science, he changed his mind and later identified the “hysteric’s discourse” with that of true science. Why? Because the discourse of the hysteric is one that questions the power wielded by the master, just like the hysterics (in a clinical sense this time) in Freud’s rooms showed their rebellion against the patriarchal discourse of the Victorian era in the very symptoms on their bodies, such as frigidity, for example. Hence, the “discourse of the hysteric” is any discourse that questions the status quo, whether the latter is political, economic, social, cultural, gender-oriented, scientific, or whatever.

The reason why Lacan later associated the discourse of “the hysteric” with that of authentic science is because true science is not — like the sciences taught at university — predicated on systematic “completability”, that is, on the implicit belief that such sciences can and will one day be systematic, unified, epistemic “wholes”. As the history of science demonstrates, this is simply not the case — every time a scientist emerges who successfully questions the very foundations of established science, an opening is created for breaking through to a paradigmatically “new” science. (Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle is an exemplary case of the hysteric’s discourse, insofar as it reveals the structural, as opposed to merely empirical, indeterminacy or “uncertainty” at the heart of science.)

The “discourse of the analyst” is the most difficult to understand, because it is a mediating discourse, according to which social relations are structured by revealing to subjects their true, but usually hidden, “desire”, which they can only pursue (if I understand Lacan correctly here, which is not necessarily the case) by “producing” a master’s discourse of sorts, that is, one which enables them temporary access to the means for pursuing this desire of theirs. I must stress the word “temporary” here, because as soon as one allows this master’s discourse to become all-consuming, one would cease being a “healthy” individual again, and require another bout of “hysterical” questioning, followed by the analyst’s mediation.

The upshot of this is that truly fulfilled, healthy individuals know that any master’s discourse they may adopt, is a fiction, in a certain sense. It therefore has to be questioned, from the position of the hysteric, to make way for the mediation of a new (temporary) master’s discourse through the analyst’s discourse — which decodes one’s words and actions in such a way as to uncover the hidden desire that may lead one to another (temporary) master’s discourse.

The discourse of the capitalist is, as previously intimated, an instance of the master’s discourse, but it adopts the position of that of the hysteric, so as to create the impression that it is on the side of those who are subordinated to the master’s discourse, while, in fact, it surreptitiously promotes the interests of the master. A good example of this is the way in which oil companies (which are part and parcel of the discursive complex of the master) adopt a stance almost indistinguishable from that of the hysteric (that is, the activists who protest against environmental damage caused by the oil companies) when it comes to the protection of the natural environment, by assuring activists that no one does more than they to protect ecosystems. This is why Lacan calls it a “clever discourse” — it masquerades as the hysteric’s discourse, but secretly advances the interests of the capitalist master. (Matthias Pauwels has written an illuminating account of the discourse of the capitalist, which may be accessible on the internet.)
A more difficult explanation might start with the fact that Lacan also provides a formula for each of the kinds of discourse, as follows:

Master’s discourse: University discourse: Analyst’s discourse: Hysteric’s discourse:
S1 > S2 S2 > a a > $ $ > S1
$ a S1 $ S2 S1 a S2

Capitalist’s discourse: Positions:
$ > S2 Agent address/command Other
S1 a Truth product

The meaning of the terms is as follows:

Terms: S1 – Master signifier; S2 – Knowledge (Knowing that … ); $ — The divided subject; a — object a and surplus pleasure.

This may seem very confusing, but it makes sense, if one considers that the way terms are positioned, is simply an indication of the power relations involved. Look at the master’s discourse, for instance: The master signifier (S1) “commands” the knowledge (university-) signifier (S2), in the sense that in this use of language (the master’s discourse) knowledge is subservient to, or at the disposal of the master. But underneath the master signifier one sees the signifier for the “divided subject” ($,) which means, graphically, that the master represses the “truth”, that is, the knowledge of his (it is usually a “he”) finitude and fallibility, which he cannot afford to admit, lest he should lose power. (The “divided subject” is the subject, that is, all humans, divided between consciousness and unconsciousness, or between seemingly stable “ego”, and the subject of the unconscious, or the “I”, who speaks, but cannot be objectified).

Underneath the signifier of knowledge one sees the symbol for “surplus pleasure” or the “object a”, which means that in the master’s discourse what is “produced” is “surplus pleasure”, or “objects” that can reveal what the master’s true desire is, namely to command society in such a way as to have all knowledge at his disposal, never doubting himself, and gaining his pleasure from this position of domination.

Each of the other discursive positions may be explained in the same formal manner, of course.

I hope this shows just how “useful” Lacan’s theory of discourse is for decoding the true intentions of the people around you by listening carefully to the way they use language. When a husband tells his wife that he is a “bit tired”, and will “listen to her complaints about the children” later, he is clearly adopting the position of the master, just as a manager does when he or she tells workers that their “grievances will be considered” by management.

On the other hand, when a friend listens patiently to you pouring out your heart to him or her, and afterwards observes that the very frequency with which you have referred to a certain person, or profession, or city, or whatever, is an indication of where your “heart is”, such a friend is adopting the discursive position of the analyst. Again, when a certain academic consistently comes up with intellectual work that questions the status quo in her or his discipline, he or she is in the discursive position of the hysteric, who is possibly pointing in a fruitful new scientific direction. I must stress, however, that this is not always the case; sometimes one adopts a hysteric’s position without good reason, but always as an important symptom that something is wrong in the field of the discourse of the university/knowledge concerned (which also implicates the master’s discourse served by that of the university or knowledge).

Anyone interested in a fuller account of Lacan’s theory of discourse, can look at the following two papers:

Bert Olivier: Lacan on the discourse of capitalism: Critical prospects. Phronimon: Journal of the South African Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities, Vol. 10 (1), 2009, pp. 25-42.
Bert Olivier: Lacan en kapitalisme. Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe (Journal of Humanities), Vol. 49 (2), June 2009, pp. 219-234.