Does architecture have an ethical function?

In his book, The ethical function of architecture (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), the American philosopher, Karsten Harries,* presents a persuasive, if novel, contemporary philosophy of architecture. In a series of short, accessible chapters he discusses a number of related themes in a clear and well-formulated manner. The themes that he addresses pertain to what has been described by various thinkers and architectural theorists as a crisis in contemporary architecture.

Harries attributes this crisis to what he regards as the forgetfulness, on the part of architecture, of its vocation or true function, partly because too many people approach architecture as if it comprises a literary text. He grants that architecture can and should be interpreted, but insists that architecture possesses a ‘language’ (note the scare quotes) of its own, which functions differently from that of literary works.

Harries does not want to give up the hope expressed by Giedion, that architecture should embody a valid way of life for our time. The question is, of course, how architecture should understand this mode of living, and how it should give expression to it. And besides, what is a ‘valid way of life’ for the present time? We live in the era of postmodernity, characterised by divergent cultural practices. Did Giedion mean that there should be only one way of life for all people, and if so, would this be desirable? Is cultural diversity not precisely a good thing, that does justice to what is peculiar to different human groups, communities and individuals? Or is architecture capable of articulating an ethos or worldview which gives concrete shape to cultural diversity?

Whatever the answer to these questions may be, it would be an indication of whether architecture is today still able to fulfil its ethical function. This ‘ethical’ function is related to the word ‘ethos’ (used above), and hence, when attributed to architecture, indicates its capacity to impart to the people who inhabit architectural works (buildings) a sense of ‘place’ or an orientation in the world.

So, for example, when one ‘feels at home’ in a specific building, or when an interior space allows one to use it well for its assigned purpose (whether it is to sleep, or to study, or write), one may say that it satisfies the ethical requirement to transform impersonal ‘space’ into human ‘place’. Conversely, when a building makes one feel uneasy or insecure – especially at an affective level, rather than intellectually (which certain deconstructive buildings tend to do, without necessarily relinquishing their ‘ethical’ function in the process – for instance the Hysolar Institute in Stuttgart) – it may well be a sign that it has failed to fulfil this role. The question arises, of course, how architecture succeeds or fails to satisfy ‘ethical’ criteria in this unusual sense, something Harries addresses along various trajectories, including that of architectural representation.

To be able to understand what Harries is aiming at in this book, one has to read it carefully. Among other things, he shows how for centuries, in western architecture, ornamentation served the purpose of embodying an encompassing worldview, until more or less the beginning of the 19th century. So, for example, Gothic cathedrals were characterised by a unified vision concerning the ‘order of creation’, expressed in typical Gothic ornamentation. In contrast to this, the 19th century witnessed a transition from ornamentation in the true sense (as bearer of a unified worldview) to mere decoration, as is encountered in art deco, for example. In the latter, ‘ornament’ no longer serves the purpose of communicating a comprehensive, unified vision, but in the form of arbitrary decoration it reflects the disintegration of the Christian-Platonic worldview.

In the place of this obsolete conception of reality, the functionalistic architecture of the 20th century — which was glorified by Adolf Loos, among others — is readily perceivable as the embodiment of a new, technological-scientific understanding of the world. According to Harries, the question remains whether a type of ornamentation is conceivable which would once again be the expression of a unified vision in architecture. He offers persuasive arguments to the effect that, in some of the works of Louis Kahn, one can discern precisely such a re-emergence of ornament in the true sense.

Harries opens up too many important perspectives on architecture in this book to be able to do it any justice in a few mere paragraphs. To achieve this would require a full-length review article. Suffice it to say that his ultimate objective is to shed light on the contemporary situation in architecture. Moreover, this is but one of the many texts on architecture which have been published by this important thinker, who also works on various other aspects of philosophy and art. No one who is interested in contemporary architecture and architectural theory can afford to ignore this work.

* Karsten Harries is Professor of Philosophy at Yale University in The United States. He is the author of numerous philosophical, art–theoretical and –historical texts, among them The Meaning of Modern Art and The Bavarian Rococo Church.