The neoliberal economic option, in conjunction with a liberal-democratic political practice, appears to have been the direction in which the ANC government under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki has been going for some time. In my own view, this is probably the reason why, judging by the nominations of candidates for leadership positions within the ANC, there has been a shift away from support for Mbeki to a show of preference for Jacob Zuma.
The relation between politics and economics is a complex one, in so far as the two domains can never be completely disentangled, and therefore sweeping statements about causal effects on the one by events in the other domain should be avoided.
However, if it is indeed the case — as it seems to be — that Mbeki has alienated himself from certain elements within the ANC and its alliance partners, I would wager that the reasons for this are intimately bound up with the failure of his neoliberal economic and liberal democratic, as opposed to social democratic, practices to address the needs and aspirations of the poor, as well as those of the more social-democratically (including socialistically) inclined people in the organisation effectively.
The switch from RDP to Gear in 1996 signalled precisely Mbeki’s interest in prioritising “growth” over “redistribution”, which could be read as a symbolic indication of putting economic growth before the needs of the people. The question is: What kind of economic growth? It is important to remember, here, that neoliberal economic practices — ultimately going back to what Adam Smith proposed in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations — promote individual enrichment rather than the shared economic prosperity of communities, and as such goes against the grain of the African communitarian spirit implied by ubuntu.
I am well aware that the extension of social grants across a broad spectrum over the past few years is an attempt (and a welcome one at that) by the Mbeki-led government to address precisely the needs of the extremely poor in the country, but evidently it has not been sufficient in the opinion of many within the ANC and, more obviously, its two alliance partners.
Closely related to this, what William Gumede (in his book Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC) has exposed as Mbeki’s “top-down” modus operandi, probably does not sit well with those party members who would like to see a return to a more democratic practice where the flow of decision-making is reversed.
Whatever may happen in the course of the ANC leadership contest, however, in light of the fact that it is likely to continue being the governing party after the next general election, it would do itself, as well as the people of South Africa, a favour by giving serious thought to the desirability of a shift of emphasis in the direction of a social-democratic model of government that is able to address the persisting economic inequalities without chasing even more people out of the country.
Just as the aim of the welfare state worldwide has always been to eradicate poverty and suffering by way of a public policy that combines economic growth and equitable distribution of wealth, no South African government could afford to deviate from this goal. But whether it is attainable by the political and economic means chosen by the Mbeki-government is, I would argue, very dubious indeed.
To those who would disagree with me on this, and point to the United States as instantiating the preferred economic and governmental model, I would respond by referring to the Nordic countries — especially Norway — as the embodiments of a salutary political and economic system. Salutary, because they combine the generation of wealth with a policy of social equality that is not limited to equitable economic distribution, but extends to the cultivation, from an early age, of an ethos of egalitarianism among their citizens.
This is manifested in the absence, in these countries, of stark or unbridgeable income gaps among citizens, and in a willingness to serve the public directly and personally on the part of political office-bearers up to ministerial level. And yet, these countries boast what counts as among the highest per capita incomes in the world. Norway and Sweden are usually among the top five countries on the United Nations Development Index, which measures things such as literacy and numeracy rates (virtually 100% in these nations), income levels, healthcare availability and crime.
Compare this with the glaring disparities in income levels in South Africa, and it should be no surprise that people are likely to shift their support in the direction of leaders who are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as representing the interests of the poor and, moreover, seem to hold out the promise (again, rightly or wrongly) of a more democratic leadership style.